Summary
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established in 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. In the 2013 mandate renewal of UNRWA, the General Assembly affirmed the importance of the provision of services "for the well-being, protection and human development of the Palestine refugees and for the stability of the region, pending the just resolution of the question of the Palestine refugees."
This evaluation assessed the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the promotion by UNRWA of a decent standard of living (DSL) for Palestine refugees from 2010-2015, a period coinciding with the UNRWA Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) and the time since the last OIOS evaluation of UNRWA. The DSL human development goal (HDG) was intended to unite the various departments and field offices (FOs) around a shared vision for improving the lives of its target population. As UNRWA embarked on its MTS 2016-2021, which envisions a similarly ambitious role for its protection focus, this evaluation aimed to harness insights from the Agency's previous experience that can help it chart a better-informed course in the years ahead.
Since the previous OIOS evaluation, the external challenges affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of UNRWA have further intensified: a political solution to the conflict underlying Palestine refugees' displacement seems even farther beyond reach, refugee numbers have grown rapidly while the resources to meet their needs have become less stable, and UNRWA human resources are no more flexible now than previously. Despite these numerous and amplified challenges, UNRWA has continued to provide services to Palestine refugees -both in the area of DSL and in its other main areas of intervention such as health and education.
However, evidence of the effectiveness of these services in improving lives has been elusive. Although UNRWA has made gains in its monitoring and evaluation function, an area of vulnerability highlighted in the previous OIOS evaluation, these functions are still underemphasized as tools to help UNRWA learn and improve. In the present evaluation, household and intercept surveys were conducted to offer a glimpse of outcome-level results, but this effort does not substitute for on-going monitoring and evaluation of results by UNRWA.
At a more fundamental level, UNRWA was unsuccessful in making the DSL HDG a platform for uniting the Agency around a shared vision for improving lives of Palestine refugees. First, UNRWA failed to specify how all corners of the Agency would work together toward the achievement of DSL. For example, health and basic education were not explicitly included in the organisational effort, and roles and responsibilities between Headquarters and FOs were not clarified. Second, intended reforms of the key programmatic areas charged with implementation of DSL were never fully realized, in contrast to non-DSL programmes. Finally, a monitoring and evaluation framework by which to assess achievement of the shared DSL goal, including outcome-level results data, was lacking.
Many of these gaps were identified in the previous OIOS evaluation, as they represent broader organisational shortcomings that extend beyond DSL, but some recommendations were not heeded. As UNRWA pivots toward protection as a similarly ambitious goal in its MTS 2016-2021, it risks similar challenges if it continues to ignore these gaps.
OIOS makes two important recommendations -both of which UNRWA has acceptednamely that UNRWA:
• Strengthen its accountability framework by clarifying roles and responsibilities, both horizontally and vertically, related to its Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016-2021 as a whole and for specific objectives; enhance organization-wide programme planning and implementation, with particular attention to cross cutting initiatives; and, strengthen its results-based monitoring and evaluation functions.
• Identify the appropriate level of resources necessary to fully meet its MTS 2016-2021 performance targets in the population it is mandated to assist (at large), and among those most in need of its assistance; and document and regularly communicate effects of any funding gaps on the achievement of the MTS 2016-2021 objectives, as well as relevant United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, to the Advisory Commission and other key stakeholders. 3. The overall evaluation objective was to determine, as systematically and objectively as possible, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the promotion of a decent standard of living for Palestine refugees by UNRWA. The topic emerged from a programme-level risk assessment described in the evaluation inception paper produced at the outset of the evaluation. 4. UNRWA management comments were sought on the draft report and taken into account in the final report. The UNRWA response is included in the annex.
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II. Background
UNRWA History and Mandate
5. UNRWA was established in 1949 by the GA resolution 302 (IV), which mandated UNRWA to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. In the 2013 triennial mandate renewal of UNRWA, the GA affirmed the importance of the provision of services "for the well-being, protection and human development of the Palestine refugees and for the stability of the region, pending the just resolution of the question of the Palestine refugees. 7. UNRWA is headed by a Commissioner-General (ComGen), ultimately accountable to the General Assembly, to whom s/he directly reports. An Advisory Commission, comprised of representatives of the Agency's major donors and host authorities, provides advice and support to the ComGen. UNRWA Headquarters are located in Amman and Gaza. Five Headquartersbased substantive departments set the priorities and policy direction for the Agency: (1) Education, (2) Health, (3) Relief and Social Services (RSS), (4) Infrastructure and Camp Improvement (ICI), and (5) Microfinance. Additional departments are responsible for support functions. The Agency's field offices (FOs) in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, SAR and West Bank each operate in highly distinct contexts.
8. In the formulation of its Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) 2010-2015, UNRWA identified four human development goals (HDGs), around which it organized its programme of work (see Figure 1) . 5 Aside from standard programming during relatively stable periods, UNRWA is mandated to provide "humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis, and as a temporary measure ..." 2010-2011 and 2014-2015 (an average of 2.5 per cent of the Agency's requirements), whereas extrabudgetary (XB) resources averaged USD 1.94 billion per biennium (an average of 97.5 per cent of its requirements). Beyond the RB and XB budget classification, in its day-to-day operations UNRWA classifies its budget along three funding "portals": General Fund, Projects, and Emergency.
8 RB resources went entirely to the first portal, whereas XB was distributed among all. 2010 -2011 , 2012 -2013 , and 2014 -2015 11. Figure 3 shows the apportionment of total planned resources across FOs, and Headquarters. 
III. Scope and methodology
12.
In focusing on HDG 3, Decent Standard of Living (DSL), the present evaluation provides forward-looking insights to assist UNRWA, while undertaking a backward-looking assessment of its performance. The DSL HDG was intended to unite the Agency around a shared approach to integrated service delivery. As UNRWA embarks on its implementation of the MTS 2016-2021, the potential exists to learn from its DSL experience in ways that might inform its approach to protection -the organization-wide initiative enshrined in the MTS 2016-2021.
13.
Though emphasizing the DSL HDG, this evaluation also performed limited synthesis of the Agency's performance on health and education see paras 59-64 for meta-evaluation); with regard to human rights work, while it is embedded in many service delivery functions, it is not directly covered within the scope of this evaluation.
14. The evaluation relied on a mixed-method approach. All evaluation results were based on triangulation of the following data sources:
i. Desk review of over 50 selected documents, including: (1) policy and strategy documents, (2) monitoring reports; (3) external documents, such as statistical reports and socio-economic surveys;
ii. Field missions in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and West Bank, which entailed: direct observations of UNRWA service delivery sites (28); semi-structured interviews and focus groups with refugees (14), management and staff (99), United Nations and non-United Nations partners (12), host authorities (9) 15. The evaluation encountered two main limitations: the scarcity of reliable UNRWAgenerated data on DSL results; and the low response rate to the staff survey. The first limitation was addressed by constructing a composite portrait of overall results through the other methods described above. The second limitation was addressed by undertaking a demographic analysis of survey respondents, which indicated an acceptable level of representativeness.
IV. Evaluation results
A.
Within an increasingly challenging operating environment, available evidence points to mixed effectiveness in UNRWA promotion of a decent standard of living 16. Since the last OIOS evaluation of UNRWA (2010), the manifold external constraints facing UNRWA have become more challenging. On top of the overarching geopolitical conflict that led to its establishment, recurring conflict affected all five FOs. 11 Additional factors include: the denial of refugees' rights; divergent policies among individual donor countries and host authorities; and demographic changes within the refugee population. In addition, the work of UNRWA has been affected by persistent resource instability and shortfalls stemming from heavy reliance on XB funding. UNRWA has worked within these constraints to respond to a large, highly expansive level of need, with no political settlement to the 65-year conflict affecting its work.
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The continued existence of significant data gaps has prevented full picture of results
17.
The following sections underline the inadequate state of UNRWA data as a knowledge source with the Agency -whether to assess the needs of its target population in specific programmatic areas, to gauge progress in achieving targeted objectives, or to measure ultimate results of UNRWA interventions in the lives of refugees. These data gaps persisted, despite being highlighted as a key shortcoming in the previous OIOS evaluation.
18. Nonetheless, there is evidence that UNRWA has mixed effectiveness in achieving the strategic objectives of the DSL HDG (see Figure 1 ). It should be noted that, because UNRWA did not define performance targets in the MTS, and targets defined in HIPs, FIPs and the RBM system were changed each biennium, OIOS indicator analysis focuses on variations between years.
Reduce abject poverty: UNRWA used its finite resources to help reduce poverty, but its coverage has declined and its contributions to actual poverty reduction are uncertain 19. UNRWA has deployed direct interventions to reduce poverty, mainly through its Social Safety Net (SSN) programme, 13 which is intended to help the poor refugees meet basic consumption needs by providing them with cash or in-kind (i.e., food packages) assistance. The poor population which UNRWA targeted shifted during the years covered by this evaluation. Therefore, to understand the data in Figure 4 , it is useful to note the following: non-poor are defined as being able to meet their essential food and non-food needs; absolute poor are able to meet their most basic food needs, but unable to meet other essential needs, such as clothing and transportation; and, abject poor do not have the means to meet even their most basic food needs. The abject poverty line is the minimum income level necessary to cover basic food needs.
11 E.g., ongoing war in SAR since 2011, and the ensuing influx of refugees into Jordan and Lebanon; movement restrictions and conflict in West Bank; and the blockade of Gaza from 2007 onwards and three major conflicts since then, resulting in significant effects on the population and direct damage to UNRWA facilities. Figure 4 indicates, in 2015, at the agency-wide level, UNRWA was able to deliver assistance to 39.9 per cent of abject poor refugees identified. This means that 55.8 per cent fewer refugees were receiving SSN transfers compared to 2012, when the absolute poor could also be benefitted (see paras 19 and 39-40). Reductions were concentrated in Lebanon and West Bank, where overall poverty is high, but abject poverty is low.
As
21. Targeting SSN transfers did not always translate into lifting the identified population out of abject poverty, however. Figure 5 shows how much of the abject poverty line was relieved by UNRWA SSN transfers, considering cash aid and local market values of food baskets.
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Comparing to the baseline target, UNRWA was able to cover the needs of the abject poor to varying degrees across its operations. Coverage increased in Jordan and Lebanon, while it remained reasonably stable in West Bank. External factors, meanwhile, were at play in the fluctuating coverage of the abject poverty line in Gaza and SAR. 22. Refugee feedback on SSN transfers is mixed. Among surveyed households receiving UNRWA SSN food benefits, approximately 51 per cent reported being very or somewhat frequently satisfied with the type, amount and quality of food they received. Eighty-five per cent of food assistance recipients reported staff were very or somewhat helpful in assisting them during the food distribution process. Regarding SSN cash assistance, 54 per cent of recipients surveyed responded that they understood how UNRWA calculated the amount of cash assistance they received, and 54 per cent said they had received the amount of cash assistance that they expected. Seventy-one per cent of food, and 41 per cent of cash recipients, responded that this assistance had very much or somewhat improved their household's living circumstances.
23. Fifty-three per cent of UNRWA staff survey respondents, meanwhile, said UNRWA was very or somewhat effective in reducing poverty amongst Palestinian refugees, while 47 per cent indicated UNRWA was somewhat or very ineffective.
24. Taken together, these monitoring and perceptual data suggest that UNRWA has provided important assistance to help offset poverty among those abject poor refugees who received SSN transfers. However, given the limited coverage of the identified poor, its contribution to reduction in the overall poverty levels among all refugees is similarly limited. Data on overall abject poverty reduction, and UNRWA contribution to it, were not collected in the current UNRWA RBM system. UNRWA has mounted considerable efforts to provide refugees with technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and to place graduates in the job market. Figure 6 illustrates the employment rates for TVET graduates for 2010-2015. 26. Among those survey respondents who received UNRWA training, satisfaction was high; 85 per cent reported they were satisfied with their experience, 94 per cent reported it would likely help them secure employment.
27. The UNRWA Job Creation Programme (JCP), in Gaza and West Bank, and the Graduate Training Programme (GTP), in Gaza, provided short-term employment opportunities for some refugees. The number of contracts UNRWA awarded varied considerably (see Figure 7 ). 28. While TVET and JCT/GPT data point to employability of those participating in UNRWA interventions, they do not factor in the overall need for employability interventions, rendering it impossible to gauge UNRWA contribution to increasing overall employability across the entirety of its targeted population.
29. UNRWA staff also pointed to the mixed success of the objective; 51 per cent of survey respondents thought UNRWA was very or somewhat effective in increasing employability and livelihoods between 2010 and 2015, while 49 per cent indicated somewhat or very ineffective.
Improve urban environment through sustainable camp development: In a context of recurrent destruction and long-standing displacement, the sustainability goal was overtaken by the need for recurrent maintenance 30. The priority associated with this goal was to improve substandard shelter, especially for the most adversely affected and vulnerable refugees. As Figure 8 indicates, agency-wide, the number of refugee families living in UNRWA-rehabilitated shelters (excluding emergency cases) peaked in 2014 at 1,344 families, driven mainly by rehabilitation work in Lebanon and West Bank. In 2015, the agency-wide number was 1,040 families, which represented 3.75 times more than in 2010. 31. Among the shelter assistance recipients surveyed, 82 per cent reported that they received all or some of the shelter assistance they expected. Fifty-seven per cent reported that they were very or somewhat frequently satisfied with the responsiveness of UNRWA staff to questions about the shelter/housing process. Among those who received UNRWA shelter assistance, satisfaction was high, with 82 per cent reporting that this assistance helped improve their household circumstances very much or somewhat.
32. These achievements took place in a context where most of the population receiving assistance either lived in host countries where they did not enjoy land ownership rights (e.g., Lebanon) or where wars led to recurrent re-building of demolished or damaged structures (e.g., Gaza, SAR). Moreover, as with employability interventions, no needs assessment data were available for the entirety of Palestine refugees; therefore, these achievements above do not indicate the extent to which UNRWA assistance contributed to improving the lives of its target population as a whole.
Offer inclusive financial services: Number of loans increased, but overall value of loans decreased; existing clients were positive about their experience 33. Expansion in number and value of microfinance loans, and diversification of microfinance clientele (with more female, young, and poor clients), have been strategies adopted by UNRWA to promote economic security and opportunity for marginalised groups. Additionally, microcredit targeted small businesses as a means to promote job creation. UNRWA also lends to nonrefugees, to contribute to programme financial sustainability.
34. The aggregate value of all UNRWA microfinance/microcredit loans declined from 2009 to 2015 agency-wide (see Figure 9 ), which can be explained by the economic and war-torn climate in the region. The value of loans to refugees decreased in all locations except Gaza. As Figure 10 indicates, credit was more thinly spread, as the number of loans disbursed to refugees agencywide increased slightly over the period of the evaluation, due to a larger number of loans to refugees in Gaza and Jordan. The number of non-refugee clients with UNRWA microfinance loans increased across all FOs. In 2010-2015, the programme opened more service branches and increased its outreach to young people and women. Overall, there is evidence of effectiveness in promoting a decent standard of living; however, the precarious operating environment has been a limiting factor and questions remain
36. Despite what has become an increasingly challenging operating environment, OIOS analyses suggest signs of success in UNRWA's delivery of services within DSL intervention areas. However, with regard to UNRWA's overall effectiveness -its impact on the lives of its target population in line with its mandate to "provide services for the well-being, protection and human development of the Palestine refugees and for the stability of the region" -, unanswered questions exist.
37. Figures 11-13 corroborate this mixed picture. When asked about the contribution UNRWA services had made toward improving their household circumstances since January 2014, the majority of DSL programme recipients provided variable feedback. TVET was rated most favourably and cash assistance least favourably; there was an average rating of "improved [my] circumstances somewhat" for most intervention areas. Meanwhile, UNRWA staff on average felt that DSL work had become somewhat less effective from 2010-2015, with considerable variation from one intervention area to the next, compared to other HDG areas. The majority cited cutback in services, austerity measures and a failure of UNRWA to meet the growing needs of the refugee population, as the reason for their effectiveness ranking. Incomplete RSS reform is yet to show effects 39. Given the growing refugee population and static UNRWA resources, reform of the RSS programme was intended to increase cost-effectiveness in poverty reduction, in particular, by reducing abject poverty through improved coverage of the poorest refugees. This goal was to be achieved mainly by moving from a Special Hardship Case model, where eligibility is based on refugee status, to the SSN model, where eligibility is based on need, thus focusing limited resources on the abject poor, who are the most vulnerable. This change entailed the introduction of a proxy means test formula to determine eligibility according to poverty level. This shift was yet to be concluded in Gaza and SAR. 24 40. UNRWA had also begun to change its delivery modality for such assistance, namely from in-kind (i.e., food) assistance to cash transfers in some fields. 25 The regional situation demanded further location-specific analysis of unintended consequences of the food-to-cash transition. For example, interviewees pointed out that semi-closed or turbulent economies could suffer with inflation and price shocks or be affected by intermediate agents and smugglers. At the same time, there was some frustration among staff and refugees alike, with continued use of food assistance. Some staff interviewees cited the long-standing reliance on sugar, flour and oil as being misaligned with the needs of a population suffering from an increased incidence of diabetes and hypertension, suggesting unintended consequences contrary to the promotion of DSL. In field visits, some refugees complained about the quality of food received, and the evaluation team observed food parcels, though clearly marked as not for sale, being sold.
41. In the household survey, when asked if they would prefer alternative means of receiving food aid, 37 per cent of recipients reported they would prefer to receive cash and 15 per cent 21 A/66/13, para 17. reported they would prefer to receive a voucher. This response varied considerably by location (see Figure 15) . Although some studies have suggested beneficiary apprehension toward cash transfers, including the possibility that women might have less control over cash than food assistance, 26 OIOS survey responses did not differ significantly by gender. 42. Another component of the Agency's poverty reduction strategy was to broaden its focus to include "a more robust and effective attack on poverty through development programming", which "would empower people to climb out of poverty and leverage the strengths inherent in refugee communities." 27 There was no evidence that this component was operationalised in a significant manner.
TVET innovations have been implemented, but labour market restrictions have constrained achievements in most fields
43. Improvements to TVET have constituted one of the eight key areas of the larger education programme reform. UNRWA has introduced new courses in its TVET centres, established partnerships with private companies, and prioritised access of vulnerable populations to TVET. UNRWA has also strengthened career orientation and job placement initiatives. These activities were fruitful in locations where refugees have the right to work and the economy was functioning, such as Jordan. However, in other circumstances, restrictions in the labour market hampered the sustainability of TVET success (see paras 25-29). In some emergency situations, the Job Creation Programme was perceived by refugees as an important poverty alleviation lifeline. However, by design, it was never intended to be a sustainable solution to structural or long-term employability challenges and provided only temporary relief. Jordan n=53
Lebanon n=57
Agency-wide n=218
Percent respondents
Cash to purchase food Voucher to purchase food Continue receiving food
New approaches devised for infrastructure and camp improvement programme have not been implemented
44. Camp Improvement Plans (CIPs) were created to integrate planning of multiple interventions -e.g. shelter rehabilitation, urban design, and provision of health and education service facilities -considering complementary economic activities, with community mobilisation and participation components. However, in 2010-2015 only eight CIPs (out of 58 possible) were initiated, developed and/or implemented. Interviewees across the departments that need to work together effectively to develop CIPs expressed frustration, citing the absence of sufficiently aligned perceptions of respective roles and responsibilities. They also reported that the programme structure at Headquarters had not been replicated in all FOs as planned. The programme has not completed the organisational transformation envisioned.
Envisioned changes to microfinance programme are pending
45. The microfinance programme operated with some autonomy and was financially selfsustainable. Since 2010 UNRWA has been considering options for transformation of its microfinance programme as a means to make further contributions to poverty alleviation. At the time of this evaluation, however, this decision-making process was pending. Reasons mentioned included the need to address relevant political, legal and financial considerations.
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Overall, limited strides have been made in improving the relevance of the UNRWA DSL work 46. Faltering envisioned reforms of DSL components have limited possible improvements in the relevance of interventions. These unfulfilled opportunities were reflected in staff perceptions (see Figure 16) . In their open-ended comments, staff asserted that in order for UNRWA to remain relevant, it must be attuned to the needs of the new generation of Palestine refugees, develop refugees' economically viable skills, and improve refugees' capacity-building. Refugees and other key informants interviewed echoed these claims. 49. However, fuller conceptualization and the roll-out of DSL fell short of what was envisioned. While performance planning documents existed, beyond this level, few elements were in place to ensure a clear, shared and whole agency approach to the implementation of the DSL goal. Indicators to measure actual performance at the strategic objectives level, though identified in the MTS, were not replicated in the HIPs and FIPs, nor were they collected in the RBM system; indicators reported were at outcome and output levels only.
50. Additionally, despite the intention to leverage DSL to enhance integration across programmes, horizontal alignment of monitoring indicators among programmes was absent, and no cross-cutting programme indicator existed to measure, e.g., the percentage of refugees with improved standards of living as a result of the collective work of UNRWA toward this goal. Concrete responsibility for each DSL strategic objective was only assigned to a single programme. And, even though the two largest UNRWA programmes, health and education, conceptually play vital roles in contributing to DSL -something recognized repeatedly in staff interviews -, such roles were never articulated by UNRWA.
51. Furthermore, although UNRWA established processes to monitor some of its progress against strategic objectives -such as Mid-year and Annual Results Review meetings -DSL monitoring lacked sufficient follow-through. This limited the ability of UNRWA to gauge its progress, explore alternative ways of achieving as-yet-unmet DSL objectives, and correct course. In this vein, Figure 18 illustrates the significant data gaps. 
Staff cite minimal shared understanding around DSL goal
52. According to staff interviewees, these factors reinforced existing programmatic silos, rather than incentivizing greater collaboration across the programmes. Interviewees stated that there was minimal shared understanding around the DSL goal, with each programme working on its own interpretation of the goal -with little clarification from senior management.
53. Results from the staff survey corroborated this sentiment: staff were more aware that strategic goals existed than they were about policies crafted to implement them (see Figure 18) . In their comments, staff respondents cited a lack of clear communication, benchmarks, and action on outcomes of previous evaluations (see result D) as hampering their ability to meet DSL objectives. In its 2010 evaluation, OIOS made six recommendations. The two which UNRWA did not implement related to putting in place its envisioned Agency Accountability Framework, and devising more robust oversight arrangements within UNRWA. 54. As a possible explanation for the inability of UNRWA to use the DSL goal to unite the Agency around a shared integrated service delivery plan, interviewees pointed out that it had no "owner" or "lead department" within UNRWA. Interviewees also pointed out the absence of sufficient formal mechanisms for integration. Two potential loci of integration of DSL servicesnamely the social worker role 32 and CIPs 33 -were cited as not being fully utilized. Two of the platforms interviewees suggested for additional programmatic cooperation included ongoing information system implementation meetings and regular interdepartmental meetings.
55. Refugee perceptions on the degree of integration in DSL service delivery varied across FOs. While 61 per cent of household respondents across the four FOs surveyed maintained that UNRWA had been effective at providing its various services in a complementary way, these percentages varied: Gaza (76); West Bank (65); Lebanon (57); and, Jordan (49).
32 Cf. MTS 2010 -2015 and UNRWA (Nov 2011) . Sustaining Cf. result B.
D.
Internal and external inefficiencies have hampered the Agency's performance, with implications for its shift from a decent standard of living to a protection focus 56. As in the 2010 OIOS evaluation, factors beyond the control of UNRWA continued to constrain its efficiency during the period reviewed, including: movement and accessibility challenges; sporadic violence; insufficient and unpredictable resources; and, constraints stemming from rigidities in the ability of UNRWA to hire, manage and reallocate staff.
57. Internal sources of inefficiency persisted as well. Monitoring and evaluation continued to be inadequate. First, as indicated in Result A, an assessment of outcome-level results was hampered by insufficient monitoring. Secondly, robust programme evaluation was lacking. Although UNRWA has made strides in improving its evaluation function -a key potential source of knowledge -this function remains weak. A 2015 UNEG peer review 34 corroborated this assessment, pointing to persistent challenges (i.e., variable evaluation quality, low investment in the evaluation function, an unreceptive organisational culture) amid gradual improvements (e.g., an improved evaluation policy that enhanced independence, increased evaluation activity, growth of an evaluation infrastructure that includes guidance and trainings, as well as a recommendations tracking system). The 2012-2013 OIOS Evaluation Scorecard report on the UNRWA evaluation function pointed toward many of these same issues, 35 and in the present evaluation, UNRWA evaluation reports were systematically assessed and determined to be of variable quality.
58. Another source of internal efficiency was structural in nature. In late 2006, UNRWA embarked on a major reform process, the Organisational Development initiative, which, as a precursor to the MTS 2010-2015, sought to strengthen UNRWA capacity in: programme management; human resources management; organizational processes and systems; and leadership and management. One key prong of this process was to decentralize and empower FOs, as front-line conduits of UNRWA services, to deliver assistance in more relevant, effective and efficient ways. However, staff interviewees reported that UNRWA subsequently reverted to a more centralized approach at least once, without clear delegation of authority at the FO level. Moreover, although in 2010 UNRWA was in the process of developing an accountability framework that would help articulate such roles and responsibilities, there was no evidence that it succeeded. Alongside the conceptual and implementation constraints surrounding DSL (see Result C), this structural challenge poses a potentially significant barrier to effective programme implementation as UNRWA shifted toward a protection focus -which, like DSL, is similarly framed as a shared Agency-wide endeavour -in the MTS 2016-2021. The new MTS, while stating the intention that each FO would develop its own MTS implementation plan, does not stipulate the respective roles and responsibilities of Headquarter and FOs. 
E.
Meta-evaluation indicated UNRWA health and education programmes made noteworthy gains, but their precise contribution to meeting overall needs was unknown, and their efficiency was affected by economic challenges 59. As noted in paras 8 and 50, health and education fell outside the DSL goal. A metaevaluation of 17 evaluations completed by UNRWA in 2010-2015 provided a snapshot of UNRWA performance in these areas (see para 14.vii). This meta-evaluation yielded a mixed picture of performance, one that is consistent with feedback from household surveys.
Health 60. The 2010-2015 HDG 1 aligned with the UNRWA health programme and UNRWA has had noteworthy successes in its provision of healthcare. 37 It gradually increased the number of primary health care facilities, for example, such that in 2013, Palestine refugees were noted as generally having adequate access to primary health care in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and West Bank. Access to maternal and child health improved as well: by 2013, 99.5 per cent of deliveries took place in hospitals and 99.6 per cent of 18-month-olds received Expanded Programme of Immunization boosters. These accessibility successes extended to particularly marginalized subpopulations.
61. More broadly, results data were mixed. While access and standards of primary healthcare were generally found to be acceptable in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank, in 2013 a key indicator of quality -the number of daily consultations per doctor, which should be low in order to maximize doctor-patient contact time -was high.
38 Moreover, while UNRWA achieved significant successes in reducing the prevalence of communicable diseases and in maternal and infant mortality, and in increasing life expectancy, significant mental health needs persisted, 39 and non-communicable diseases such as hypertension and diabetes increased.
62. The meta-evaluation presented a mixed picture of efficiency as well. In a 2013 study, UNRWA generally compared favourably with host authorities on key measures of health sector efficiency, largely because UNRWA internalized costs rather than relying on contractors to provide services. In addition, aspects of procurement and supply chain management were economical. However, stock shortages were reported, owing primarily to inadequate budgets for this function, delivery problems and manual rather than electronic inventory management. Procurement processes, meanwhile, were criticized for inadequate regulatory standards, and in some cases, for being cost-inefficient. UNRWA has taken a number of steps to address these complex dynamics; for example, it is in the process of implementing a joint procurement-health programme initiative projecting it will reduce costs while increasing buffer stocks of medical supplies.
37 OIOS meta-evaluation of the UNRWA universe of 2010-2015 health programme evaluations. 38 Reasons for this high volume and low contact time were uncovered on both the supply side and the demand side. On the supply side, these reasons included no-cost consultations and prescriptions, doctors' exclusive right to prescribe medications, and the overly generous prescription of medications (recent data show this is declining). On the demand side, the hard economic and social situation of refugees, coupled with (and in some cases leading to) an increased prevalence of chronic diseases, increased demand for health care. 39 In 2016 UNRWA began implementing a strategy for integrating mental health and psychosocial support services into its primary health facilities.
Education
63. The 2010-2015 HDG 2 aligned with the UNRWA education programme. As of 2015, UNRWA provided education for 493,500 Palestinian children in 685 schools. Beyond this output level, the evaluations reviewed did not contain up-to-date information on education outcomes across all FOs. (On the other hand, UNRWA itself recorded noteworthy indicative examples of positive outcomes.) As with health, these and other educational achievements often brought UNRWA on par with, or better than, prevailing statistics for the non-refugee population.
64. Assessments of efficiency painted a similar picture to health. The UNRWA education programme regularly experienced significant budget deficits due to supply-side and demand-side dynamics. On the supply side, inflation, the challenging security context, and increasing salary rates have led to fast-rising costs of service provision. On the demand side, one evaluation warned that the needs of an increased number of refugees were not matched with available resources, thus affecting the availability and quality of education. While decreased class sizes have made for better learning environments, this approach has increased per-student costs.
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IV. Conclusion
65. Since the 2010 OIOS evaluation, the manifold external challenges faced by UNRWA have intensified: rapidly growing number of Palestine refugees, unstable financial resources as a result of global economic uncertainty, and inflexible hiring and management of staff. Despite these challenges, UNRWA has continued to provide services to Palestine refugees -both in its DSL interventions and in health and education.
66. Beyond indications of effectiveness at the level of output delivery, however, evidence of results in improving the lives of Palestine refugees has been elusive. Fundamentally, UNRWA was not successful in making the DSL HDG a platform for uniting the Agency around a shared vision for improving lives of Palestine refugees. UNRWA did not provide conceptual clarity on how all corners of the Agency would work together to achieve the goal. Reform in the departments charged with its implementation was insufficient. There were no structural arrangements to clarify roles and responsibilities between Headquarters and FOs. And, and a shared monitoring and evaluation framework to assess the Agency's collective achievement of a shared HDG was missing. While household and intercept data offered a glimpse at outcome results, they do not substitute for on-going monitoring and evaluation of results by UNRWA itself as a tool to help it learn and improve. Many of these shortcomings were addressed in the 2010 OIOS evaluation, but remain outstanding. As UNRWA pivots toward a similarly ambitious goal in the 2016-2021 MTS, that of protection, it risks similar shortcomings if these gaps are not addressed.
V. Recommendations
67. OIOS makes two recommendations which it deems to be important as per its criticality rating system. UNRWA has accepted both of these recommendations. OIOS notes that UNRWA, in its action plan provided in Annex I, claims that individual aspects of each recommendation were already underway or implemented at the time of the evaluation report's release. This implementation status was not revealed during this evaluation, including during the report review process, and OIOS uncovered no evidence during its evaluation to indicate as much. OIOS was therefore not in a position to determine whether the recommendations' implementation occurred because of or independent of the present evaluation. In order to remedy this discrepancy, in its semi-annual follow-up and in its three-year follow-up triennial review on the implementation of the present recommendations, OIOS will endeavour to assess the timing of the various outputs associated with individual recommendations' implementation status.
Recommendation 1 (see Results A, C, D and E)
To strengthen its accountability framework, and achieve the goals envisioned in the MTS 2016-2021 as effectively and efficiently as possible, UNRWA should do the following (in line its previous plan to establish an accountability framework):
(a) Clarify the roles and responsibilities, both horizontally and vertically, for the MTS 2016-2021 as a whole and for its specific objectives, including Department(s) bearing primary responsibility for each objective and Department(s) responsible for contributing to the achievement of each;
(b) Build on the HIPs and FIPs and include the specific elements that will be utilized to enhance organization-wide programme planning and implementation, with particular attention to cross cutting initiatives; (c) Strengthen its results-based monitoring and evaluation functions by (1) establishing clear linkages in the RBM system between MTS 2016-2021 strategic goals, unit work plans and personal work plans (2) establishing consistent baseline data, performance targets, SMART 41 indicators and improved data availability (3) identifying risks such as unintended consequences and sustainability concerns, and (4) identifying mechanisms that will be used for internal monitoring of performance against the MTS 2016-2021 plan, including monitoring and evaluation feedback loops.
[Indicators of achievement: Development and implementation of a more comprehensive accountability plan geared toward effective implementation of the MTS 2016-2021 including: related to (a) guidance issued by senior management on roles each Department will bear in relation to the achievement of each objective; related to (b) HIPs and FIPs that include specific information on the elements which will be utilized to achieve planning and implementation of cross cutting initiatives; and, related to (c) a results- 
UNRWA follow-up to OIOS Report on the Evaluation of UNRWA dated 8 July 2016
Towards strengthened accountability and achieving the appropriate level of resources
1.
Thank you for the evaluation of UNRWA contained in the OIOS Report dated 8 July 2016, with particular emphasis on the third Human Development Goal set out in the Agency's previous Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2010-2015, namely the Agency's goal to help Palestine refugees achieve a "Decent Standard of Living". UNRWA has reviewed the OIOS Report on the Evaluation of UNRWA and appreciates its analysis and findings.
2.
UNRWA appreciates that the OIOS Report acknowledges, in the summary and at paragraph 65, that the external challenges affecting UNRWA have further intensified. This is indeed the case. In addition to the factors noted in the Report -i.e., the lack of a political solution, increased refugee numbers, less stable resources to meet refugee needs, and staff management challenges -the instability and recurrent conflict in the external environment, which is beyond UNRWA's control, must be emphasized. The armed conflict in Syria has entered its sixth year and has intensified, causing deepening humanitarian and protection needs. Lebanon and Jordan have generously offered sanctuary to over 1 million civilians fleeing the conflict in Syria, despite the substantial burdens this has placed on them. There have been two conflicts in Gaza in the recent period, compounded by a 9-year blockage, resulting in almost the entire population being dependent upon aid to meet basic needs. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, violence, access restrictions, demolitions, and other rights violations continue. Such a context of insecurity and instability impacts all five of UNRWA's areas of operations on a daily basis. None the less, the Agency's role as a reliable service provider to Palestine refugees contributes a measure of dignity and stability in the areas in which it operates.
3.
As you may recall, UNRWA management encouraged OIOS to evaluate Human Development Goal no. 3 of the MTS 2010-2015 for many of the reasons now reflected in the OIOS Report as Agency shortcomings. Among other things, UNRWA recognized weaknesses in its efforts to achieve Human Development Goal no. 3 and welcomed the opportunity to benefit from an OIOS evaluation of that Goal. UNRWA and its Advisory Commission specifically recognized the challenges associated with achievement of Goal no. 
4.
Firstly, the MTS 2016-2021 recognizes that realizing change at the level of human development for Palestine refugees will require concerted effort by all international actorsincluding host countries, donor countries, Israel (as the occupying power over two Fields in which UNRWA operates), other international organizations, and civil society. UNRWA cannot, through its programmes and operations alone, compete against the ever worsening environmental and external factors that are driving Palestine refugees further into poverty and unemployment. Poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity levels for Palestine refugees increased over the period of 2010 to 2015 primarily due to factors outside UNRWA's control or influence. These factors include the continued occupation of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), the continuing blockade of Gaza, two conflicts in Gaza between 2010 and 2015, the ongoing war in Syria, and the continued deprivation of human rights of Palestine refugees in Lebanon. In the MTS 2016-2021, UNRWA has opted not to repeat strategic objectives that it is unable meaningfully to influence. Instead, the MTS 2016-2021 has identified five Strategic Outcomes that UNRWA is able to contribute to -i.e., where change can be attributed (at least in part) to the effectiveness of UNRWA's programmes.
5.
Secondly, over the last several years UNRWA has been addressing the observation that insufficient data exists concerning the human development of the overall Palestine refugee population. In this regard, UNRWA has been bridging the information/research gaps noted in the OIOS Report. UNRWA has completed a Human Development Study of Palestine refugees which, in turn, draws upon recent studies conducted of the Palestine refugee population in each of its Fields of operation. This work establishes a baseline on relevant indicators of the entire eligible population and further establishes a research agenda for the coming years that has the potential to influence strategic decision-making.
6.
Thirdly, UNRWA has improved its common monitoring matrix of performance indicators as part of the development of the MTS 2016-2021. Monitoring systems, structures and processes have already been strengthened to support the MTS 2016-2021 in those areas identified as weak in the OIOS Report.
7.
Fourthly, embedded in the MTS 2016-2021 is an ambitious reform agenda for those subprogrammes that were identified in the MTS 2010-2015 as contributing to Human Development Goal no. 3. Among other things, UNRWA is in the process of reforming its Technical Vocational Education Training, Education Science Faculties, and Scholarships to more effectively target vulnerable groups and to be more market-oriented. UNRWA is also reforming the Microfinance Programme to generate more microfinance opportunities. It has embarked on a number of innovative pilots including, for example, an IT gateway project in Gaza that has the potential to create employment opportunities for talented youth, despite the ongoing blockade in Gaza. UNRWA is further using its Relief and Social Services Programme and Protection Programme to develop a better understanding of the factors that are driving increasing vulnerability amongst different cross-sections of the Palestine refugee population across its five Fields. This analysis will inform advocacy efforts and contribute to targeting methodologies and approaches in other UNRWA programmes.
8.
Fifthly, the Agency has strengthened its planning framework and structures to ensure that MTS 2016-2021 strategic objectives are reflected throughout its strategic plans and operational plans (which, together, replace the need for biennial "headquarters implementation plans" and "field implementation plans" referred to in the OIOS Report). These strategic and operational plans are collectively owned by Field Offices, HQ Programme Departments, and HQ Support Departments. They are established in a highly consultative process, monitored throughout the period of implementation using common/Agency-wide indicators, and reported on a bi-annual and annual basis. Greater alignment has already been achieved between programmatic and operational results, budgets, and management compacts. Results Based Management and Enterprise Risk Management systems, procedures, and structures have further been established that ensure accountabilities are clear for achieving the strategic objectives set out in the MTS 2016-2021.
9.
Sixthly, UNRWA has been working with other partners in host countries and in the broader developmental system, including the United Nations family, to establish strategic partnerships with organizations that are better placed to contribute to and accomplish the human development goals for Palestine refugees that UNRWA is not in a position to achieve alone.
10.
With respect to a lack of clear communication noted in paragraph 53 of the OIOS Report, UNRWA has already strengthened its internal communication with staff with generous support provided by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Since early 2015 UNRWA has reached out to staff through new targeted and innovative methods, including direct and social media engagements. In late 2015 UNRWA also established an Internal Communications Unit in the Executive Office, dedicated to enhancing two-way communication with staff and highlighting the Commissioner-General's commitment to transparent and active engagement with staff, including on sensitive issues.
11.
In addition, UNRWA takes this opportunity to comment specifically on paragraph 10 of the OIOS Report, which suggests that the level of financial support to UNRWA's operations has been declining relative to a number of factors listed therein. UNRWA would like to point out that the absolute support received from donors has been increasing in a difficult environment for humanitarian funding. However, this growth in its financial support has not kept pace with increasing refugee numbers and needs that result in both increasing demand for UNRWA's services and increasing operating costs. Increased expenditure has also been necessitated by United Nations system-wide requirements and donor demands. The issue of funding is an important one that is recognized in the MTS 2016-2021 as one of the highest enterprise risks faced by the Agency. UNRWA recognizes that there are opportunities for it to become more cost effective -and it is proactively addressing these opportunities through various programmatic and operational reforms -but in the absence of any real improvement in the external environment in which refugees live and in the enjoyment of their human rights, UNRWA cannot achieve its strategic objectives under the status quo. It requires, as a matter of priority and urgency, a greater injection of additional and sustainable funding so that mandated services to Palestine refugees are not put at risk, such as occurred in summer 2015, when there was a real risk to the opening of UNRWA schools for 500,000 Palestine refugee children. UNRWA is making every effort, with the assistance of the Advisory Commission, to respond to the structural nature of its financial challenges and to advocate for measures that will put the Agency on stable financial footing so that it may reliably serve Palestine refugees.
12.
In closing, UNRWA affirms its commitment to improved efficiency and effectiveness in accordance with UN best practice. In its MTS 2016-2021, UNRWA commits to establishing a stronger foundation of efficient and effective management through, inter alia, building an ambitious relationship and fundraising approach to maximize resources and strengthening management systems to maximize impact and effective response as well as to address some key sustainability challenges facing the Agency. To achieve a more stable financial footing, the Agency has engaged in important reforms, introduced stringent budget processes and controls, and approved a zerogrowth budget for 2016, and it looks to donors and partners for essential accompanying and increased support.
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